

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100290002-7

(SENSITIVE)

7 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : ONE Memorandum, "Communist Reactions to Certain  
U.S. Courses of Action," 6 February 1967

REFERENCE : TS (Sensitive) No. 185997

25X1A9a

1. The Board of National Estimates yesterday completed its consideration of the memorandum cited above. The ORR representative was [REDACTED]. The memorandum was prepared to estimate Communist reactions to the alternative bombing programs discussed in McNamara IV (The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems).

2. The ONE memorandum essentially finds that none of the bombing programs would force Hanoi to negotiate. It points out, however, that external factors such as the Sino-Soviet dispute, the chaos in China, and problems in maintaining the flow of external assistance could affect Hanoi's attitudes. It also estimates that the USSR might seek to persuade Hanoi to negotiate, but would not try to force it to negotiate. Finally, the memorandum estimates that none of the bombing programs would lead to war with the USSR or China.

3. We believe that the memorandum does not fully spell out the severity of the supply problems which would face Hanoi -- particularly after the mining program and the attack on the dikes. Similarly, the memorandum tends to understate the extent to which Hanoi's persistence in the war would necessitate hard and painful decisions about its involvement. The Board felt that these points did not require extensive restatement, since the memorandum is, in effect, a companion piece to McNamara IV, which presented them in considerable detail.

4. On balance, we feel that although the memorandum has the shortcomings mentioned above, they are insufficient to warrant DD/I non-concurrence.

25X1X8

151 BILL  
IAM N. MORELL, JR.  
Director  
Research and Reports

TS 192860  
Copy No. 8 of 9

Distribution:

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100290002-7

(SENSITIVE)

**TOP SECRET**

**(SENSITIVE)**

## SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	<p>ORR Comments on ONE Memorandum,          Communist Reactions to Certain U.S.          Courses of Action, 6 February 1967</p> <p>REF: 185997 (Sensitive)</p>	REGISTRY
SOURCE OCB/ENA		CIA CONTROL NO. 192860
DOC. NO.		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 7 February 1967
DOC. DATE 7 February 1967		LOGGED BY mlc/OCB/T/RR
COPY NO. 8 of 9		
NUMBER OF PAGES One		
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS None		

**ATTENTION:** This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of handling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.

[illegible]

**NOTICE OF DETACHMENT:** When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:

**DOWNGRADED** ☐

**DESTROYED** ☐

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO

BY (Signature)

OFFICE

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

**TOP SECRET**